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DICTA

Dec., 1953

CIVIL REMEDIES AND CIVIL PROCEDURE
FRED M. WINNER of the Dcuver Bar
AMENDMENTS TO THE RULES

By amendments effective November 12, 1952, major changes
were made in the rules of appellate procedure. (1) the most important of these changes are:
1. The time within which to obtain a writ of error was reduced from one year to three months from the date of final
judgment.
2. The requirement for specification of points was eliminated,
and it is now required that the summary of the argument
contain a concise statement of the points relied upon.
3. If under 35 pages (including all appendices) briefs may
be typewritten or mimeographed; if typewritten or mimeographed, ten copies are filed; if printed, fifteen copies are
filed; if typewritten, one copy is served; and, if mimeographed or printed, two copies are served.
4. The brief of plaintiff in error must contain a succinct statement of the case in lieu of an abstract of record, and must
carry specific folio references.
5. Requests for extension of time must set forth how many,
and at whose request, previous extensions were granted.
6. Petitions for rehearing may be typed or mimeographed, but
they must be limited to three pages (unless special permission of the Court is obtained) and oral arguments are
not permitted.
INTERPRETATION OF THE RULES BY THE COURT

In two cases the Court held that insofar as the Rules are not
inconsistent with special statutes, the Rules are applicable to
statutory proceedings. Thus, in Boxberger v. State Highway Commission,' it was held that the Rules apply to eminent domain-at
least as to the filing of motions-although it was specifically held
that an answer is not required. Also, in Sitler v. Braians,2 where
the statute allowed 20 days to "appeal" an election contest, it was
held that the 20-day time limit was applicable, although appeals
have been abolished. (1) For a complete discussion of these changes,
see article by Mr. Percy S. Morris.3
The Court held that "the purpose of the 1941 statute (abolishing appeals) seems to be to determine the method, rather than the
time, of review by this court, and the change of method would not
by implication change the time limitation."
The validity of service of process outside Colorado in an ac1126 Colo. 526, 251 P. 2d 920 (1952).
' 126 Colo. 370, 251 P. 2d 319 (1952).
0Dicta, Vol. XXX, No. 1 (Jan. 1953).
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tion in personam was involved in Kellner v. District Court.4 Plain-

tiffs contended defendants were residents of Colorado, and, pursuant to Rule 4 (f) (1),5 defendants were served in California.
The service was held to be void.
In Ginsberg v. Zagar6 it was held that the language of Rule
9 (b) : "the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be
stated with particularity" means that fraud must be alleged with
the same particularity demanded under the code. It was said "The
'particularity' thus required is that which in numerous decisions
we have defined in actions for fraud and deceit, prior to the adoption of our Rules of Civil Procedure."
Smith v. Kent Oil Co.7 emphasized the provisions of Rule 8 (c)
that affirmative defenses must be affirmatively pleaded. It was there
held that a defense of a statute of limitations can not be raised by
motion to dismiss, but must be raised affirmatively by answer.
Joinder of claims under Rule 18 was involved in Colorado
Board of Architects v. District Court.8 There, plaintiff attempted
to join a suit against the Board for a mandatory injunction with
an action of damages against the individual members of the Board.
In holding the joinder to be improper, it was said: "The several
defendants must be charged in the same character. Officers of a
municipal corporation cannot, in the same action, be charged officially and personally."
Additionally, Colorado State Board of Architects v. District
Court 9 recognized the conflict which before existed in Colorado
concerning the effect of answering and proceeding to trial where a
motion for a change of venue was improperly overruled. Under
these earlier cases (which are reviewed in the opinion) it was uncertain whether the improper venue was waived if defendant answered. After the decision in Colorado State Board of Architects
v. District Court, it seems clear that defendant does not waive the
objection of improper venue if he answers after a motion for
change of venue has been improperly overruled. The Court said:
"The party who resists a motion for change of venue, to which his
opponent is clearly entitled as a matter of right, does so at his peril.
If the motion erroneously is denied and the moving party suffers
adverse judgment, a reversal of the judgment with direction to
change the venue would certainly follow."
In People v. District Court 10 "venue" was held to be the
equivalent of "jurisdiction" in a divorce case. There, complaint
was filed in Rio Grande County, and it was alleged that the parties
were residents of that county. Later, it was established that both
4........ Colo ......... 256 P. 2d 887, 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 12.
' Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U. S. 457, 61 S. Ct. 339.
6126 Colo. 536, 251 P. 2d 1080 (1952).
..-... Colo .......... 261.P. 2d 149, 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 27.
1126 Colo. 340, 249 P. 2d 146 (1952).
9 Supra.
10....... Colo ......... 258 P. 2d 483, 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 22.
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parties lived in Denver, and it was held that the trial court was
without jurisdiction. The Court held that the provision of the
statute that a divorce case be filed in the county of the parties'
residence was jurisdictional. It was said: "It is a jurisdictional
question and cannot be waived by the parties. Unless the residence
required by the statute is in some manner shown, the court is without jurisdiction."
The past year has seen two decisions interpreting the discovery
rules. In General Accident Insurance Co. v. Mitchell" it was held
that Rule 34 does not permit the inspection of confidential communications between attorney and client; and in Ridley v. Young 12
the effect of interrogatories under Rule 33 was considered.
There, defendant made certain admissions in his answers to
interrogatories. He did not appear at time of trial, and other witnesses called in defendant's behalf contradicted his admissions. The
Court held: (1) The admissions made in the interrogatories were
not evidence in the case until the answers were offered in evidence
as an exhibit; and (2) the admissions were not "judicial admissions" in the sense that they could not be contradicted. The Court
said: "we hold that the answers to the interrogatories in the instant
case are not such 'judicial admissions' as to be conclusive against
the defendant Young, and the trial court did not err in receiving
the evidence to which plaintiff Ridley objected."
In Morland v. Durland Trust Company 13 the Court again
pointed out that a summary judgment is an extraordinary remedy,
and that a motion for summary judgment should be granted only
where "no material factual issue remains in the case ... (and only
where) the facts are clear and undisputed." This case presented
the somewhat unusual situation of having both parties move for
summary judgment, and it was contended that under these circumstances the trial judge was bound to decide the case on summary judgment. In overruling this contention, the Supreme Court
pointed out that although a motion for summary judgment admits
all facts well pleaded, admission is made only under movant's
theory of the case, and is not binding for all purposes; and it was
said: "The fact that both parties make motions for summary judgment, and each contends in support of his respective motion that
no genuine issue of fact exists, does not require the court to rule
that no fact issue exists."
Rule 59 (Motion for New Trial) was involved in several decisions during the past year. In Morron v. McDaniel 14 the trial
judge entered an order to abate the action until further order of
the court.
Acting under the familiar rule, the writ of error was dismissed
on the ground that there was no final judgment. However, that rule
u..... Colo ..........
........ Colo ..........
18........ Colo ..........
........ Colo ..........
12

259
253
252
254

P. 2d 862, 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 26.
P. 2d 433, 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 12.
P. 2d 98, 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 10.
P. 2d 862, 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 14.
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was not extended to cover the situation in Scott v. Matsuda.15 There
a new trial was granted, and plaintiff, saying that he had made
the strongest case he could make, sued out a writ of error. The
Court recognized that ordinarily the granting of a new trial lies
within the discretion of the trial judge, but held that under the
facts of Scott, there was an abuse of discretion. Under the Rules,
the Court has held that ordinarily a judgment is not final until motion for new trial is overruled. Bankers Co. v. Hall.1 6 However, in
Scott, the Court was not acting without precedent, for it was held
in Mooney vs. Carter17 (where the question of "final judgment"
was expressly considered) that if the "intention of the parties was
to treat the action of the trial court as though the court had dismissed the action or granted a non-suit" the Court would consider
the case on writ of error.
In Goodwin v. Eller ' it was held that the trial court could
make new findings on motion for new trial, and, after originally
holding in favor of one party, could hold in favor of the other party
on the new trial motion. King v. Avila,19 reviewed earlier decisions
under Rule 59, and held that a new trial could be granted on the
question of damages only where, "under the evidence, it can be
definitely said that the verdict is grossly and manifestly inadequate, or the amount thereof is so small as to clearly and definitely
indicate that the jury neglected to take into consideration evidence
of pecuniary loss or was influenced by prejudice, passion or other
improper consideration."
The old question of quotient verdicts was raised in Harvey v.
Thorpe.20 The case followed the rule established under the code
that a quotient verdict is ground for new trial only where there is
an "antecedent agreement by the jury to be bound by the resulting
quotient."
There is no discussion in the case of the difference between the
language of the Rules and the Code ;2 and the Court adopts exactly the same test under the Rules as was applied under the code.
Platte Valley Elevator Co. v. Gebauer 21 followed the established rule that points not raised in motion for new trial would not
be considered by the Supreme Court.
During the year, the Court had occasion in several cases to
point out that briefs should be filed in strict accordance with the
Rules, and that failure to abide by the Rules may result in dismissal
........
- Colo.......... 255 P. 2d 403, 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 16.
1116 Colo. 566, 183 P. 2d 390 (1947).
17114 Colo. 267, 160 P. 2d 390 (1945).
........ Colo .......... 258 P. 2d 493, 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 23.
........
- Colo.......... 259 P. 2d 268, 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 24.
........ Colo ......... 253 P. 2d 1062, 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 12.
Rule 59 provides that "misconduct of the jury" shall be a ground for new
trial, while the code said, "Misconduct of the jury, and when any one or more
of the jurors shall have been induced to assent to a general or special verdict
; ... by resort to the determination of chance."
........ Colo .......... 256 P. 2d 903, 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 18.
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2
Spillane v. Wright;23
2
5
.
Burnham
v.
Hays
Bandimer;
Clemann v.
Kellner v. District Court 26 was an original proceeding, and
defendant argued that the case should be dismissed because no
question of "great public importance" was involved. The opinion
recognizes that there is some confusion between the language of
Rules 106 and 116, but it was held that where it appears that the
lower court is without jurisdiction, the Supreme Court will accept
jurisdiction in an original proceeding. The Court said: "We adhere
to, and further emphasize, the statements in Carlson v. District
Court,27 'no question of greater "public importance" can arise than
one in which a court is proceeding without jurisdiction of the person or subject matter'."

v. Lowery;
on a writ of error. Mauldin
24

2.... Colo ..........
........ Colo ..........
........ Colo... .......
.-----Colo .......
...
Colo .........
116 Colo. 330,

255 P. 2d 976, 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 14.
259, P. 2d 1078, 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 27.
259 P. 2d 614, 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 26.
257 P. 2d 972, 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 20.
256 P. 2d 887, 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 12.
180 P. 2d 525 (1947).
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SHEPARD'S CITATIONS CELEBRATES ITS
80TH BIRTHDAY
In the course of publishing articles of interest to the legal
profession, we pause to note the eightieth anniversary of Shepard's
Citations without whose citation system the preparation of most
of these articles would have been much more difficult than it was.
In 1873, Frank Shepard began providing attorneys in Chicago
with a case citation service limited in scope and cumbersome in
form. Now, eighty years later, there are compact Shepard publications meeting the citation requirements of every attorney in every
jurisdiction throughout the United States. Basic bound volumes
kept current with periodic cumulative supplements show citations
to every case reported in the state reports and in the National
Reporter System and to every case decided in the federal courts
as well as citations to constitutions, to statutes, and to other repositories of the law.
As the Shepard organization approaches its eighty-first year,
it may take justifiable pride in the knowledge that its publications
rest securely on the shelves of all complete law libraries.
To commemorate its eightieth anniversary, Shepard's has
published a booklet entitled "Four Score Years of Service to the
Legal Profession" and will gladly send a copy to anyone requesting it.

